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ARE PARTNERSHIPS AGGREGATES OR ENTITIES
WHEN DETERMINING THE AVAILABILITY OF
INVESTMENT CREDIT FOR USED PROPERTY?
The investment credit. grants taxpayers who purchase certain proper-
ties substantial tax savings by setting off part of the property's purchase
price directly against the purchaser's income tax.1 The availability of the
investment credit in instances when a partner acquires property previously
used or owned by his partnership, or when a partnership acquires property
previously used or owned by one of its partners, depends on which of two
conflicting theories concerning the nature of partnerships2 is adopted. One
theory views the partnership as merely an aggregate of individuals, while
the other views the partnership as a separate entity? The Internal Revenue
Code' (the Code) treats a partnership5 as an aggregate for taxpayer obliga-
I See I.R.C. § 38.
2 The Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as ". . an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNIFoRM PATrNERsn ACT § 6(1).
3 Under the aggregate theory, sometimes called the conduit theory, individual partners
are viewed as co-owners of the enterprise. Under the entity theory, a partnership is considered
a separate entity, entirely distinct from the partners. Thus, the entity theory accords partner-
ships a legal status similar to that given to corporations. A. ARONSOHN, PARTNERSHW INCOME
TAXATION 1-2 (6th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as ARONSoHN].
The conflict between the entity and aggregate theories is centuries old. See generally 1
A. WiLus, PARTNERSHip T, TION, § 201 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WuLms]. Although
the English common law generally regarded partnerships as aggregates, the civil law treated
partnerships as separate entities. ARONsoHN, supra at 2. In addition, merchantile law adopted
the entity theory for partnerships. R. SUGARMAN, SuGAxMA ON PARTrNmS § 4 (4th ed.
1966). The conflict between the two theories is evident in the Uniform Partnership Act. While
Dean Ames, the original drafter of the Act, would have treated the partnership as an entity,
Dean Lewis, who wrote the final drafts of the Act, favored the aggregate theory. Although
the completed Uniform Partnership Act is based primarily on the common law aggregate
theory, the Act encompasses a part of each theory. 1 BARRErr & SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PART-
NERSHIPS: LAw AND TATION 154-55 (1956).
1 As the laws governing federal taxation grew more complex, Congress decided to consoli-
date and organize the tax law into one code. The result was the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. By the early 1950's, the many tax law changes which had occurred since 1939 resulted
in studies to reorganize the Code. These studies led to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The 1954 Code, as amended from time to time, is the fundamental tax law in effect today.
The Code is incorporated in the United States Code as Title 26. See C. McCARTHY, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX: ITS SOURCES Am APPLICATION 4-5 (3d ed. 1974).
1 The income tax concept of a partnership is broader than the common law concept and
includes groups not commonly called partnerships. See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1 (1956). The
Internal Revenue Code includes within the term partnership ". . .a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any busi-
ness, financial operation, or venture is carried on and which is not within the meaning of this
title [subtitle], a corporation or a trust or estate." I.R.C. § 761(a).
Prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, see note 4 supra, there were few statutory
provisions dealing with partnerships. Therefore, courts often were required to determine on
a case by case basis whether a partnership should receive aggregate or entity treatment. See,
e.g., Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 594 (1934) (partner-
ship holds stock contributed by partner as an entity); United States v. Coulby, 251 F. 982
(N.D. Ohio 1918), aff'd 258 F. 27 (6th Cir. 1919) (per curiam) (partnership an aggregate for
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tions, but as an entity for most other purposes.' In some instances, how-
ever, the Code does not expressly state whether aggregate or entity treat-
receiving income from dividends on stock owned by partnership). While the skeletal partner-
ship provisions found in the 1939 Code were an improvement, they did not cover many of
the problems that frequently arose with respect to partnerships and partners. See 6 J. MER-
T ms, THE LAW oF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATON, § 35.01 (5th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
MERTmas]. Thus in many cases, courts still had to make a case by case analysis to ascertain
whether the aggregate or entity theory was appropriate. This common law approach led to
inconsistent results on similar issues tried before different courts. Compare Benjamin v.
Hoey, 47 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 139 F.2d 945 (2d Cr. 1944)
(partnership that is paid commission by partner treated as aggregate) and Swiren v. Comm'r,
183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 912 (1951) (partner's share of legal fees
owed partnership is held by partner; sale of partner's share is capital gain) with Harvey M.
Toy, 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 42,451 (1942) (partnership that is paid commission by partner
treated as entity) and Doyle v. Comm'r, 102 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1939) (partner's share of legal
fees owed partnership is held by the partnership; sale of partner's share not capital gain).
I In United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 n.8 (1973), the Supreme Court noted that
"[t]he legislative history indicates, and the commentators agree, that partnerships are enti-
ties for purposes of calculating and filing informational returns but that they are conduits
through which the taxpaying obligation passes to the individual partners in accord with their
distributive shares." The individual Code provisions, however, indicate that the Supreme
Court's statement is an oversimplification.
The Code provisions that specifically deal with partnerships appear in Subchapter K,
§§ 701 through 761. Section 701 provides that a partnership is not subject to income tax, and
§ 702 states that each partner must take into consideration his distributive share of partner-
ship income in determining his personal income tax liability. I.R.C. §§ 701, 702. These two
sections, which deal with a partnership's taxpaying obligations, clearly treat the partnership
as an aggregate. The partnership serves merely as a conduit through which taxpaying obliga-
tions flow. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 89 (1954). Section 704, which sets out rules
for determining a partner's distributive share, adds to the Code's aggregate approach toward
partnership taxpaying obligations.
As the Supreme Court indicated, most of the other sections recognize the partnership as
an entity for purposes of calculating and filing informational returns. Section 703, for exam-
ple, provides that. the taxable income of a partnership, with a few exceptions, shall be com-
puted in the same manner as an individual's taxable income. In allowing partnerships to have
a different taxable year than its partners, § 706 treats partnerships as entities. In addition,
the Code adopts the entity concept for guaranteed annual payments to a partner for services
or the use of capital. See I.R.C. §§ 706(a), 707(c); Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen & Warren,
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 1183, 1201-04 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as CoLuln. L. REv.]. In addition to the provisions in Subchapter K, §
7701(a)(1), applicable throughout the Code, defines the word "person" to include partner-
ships.
The Supreme Court's broad declaration that partnerships are entities for purposes of
calculating and filing informational returns begins to break down with § 707 of the Code. The
general rule of § 707, which treats transactions between a partnership and a partner acting
in his individual capacity as transactions between the partnership and an outsider, follows
the entity theory. This general rule, however, is subject to two modifications which treat the
partnership as an aggregate to prevent tax avoidance. CoLulr. L. REv., supra at 1200-01.
Section 751, which converts part of a capital gain into ordinary income by ignoring the
underlying assets of the partnership, is also arguably an application of the aggregate theory.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the partnership sections of the 1954 Code indicates that
no inference is to be drawn from the "entity" treatment of transactions between partners and
partnerships for the purpose of applying other provisions of the internal revenue laws if the
aggregate concept is more appropriate for those provisions. H. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d
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ment is appropriate. The Code's failure to state which partnership theory
is appropriate becomes a problem in determining investment credit availa-
bility.
Under the investment credit provisions of the Code,7 only a certain type
of property is eligible for the investment credit. Such property, referred to
as "section 38 property," must have a useful life of at least three years,'
be depreciable or amortizable,9 and must be either tangible personal prop-
erty"° or other tangible property that is closely connected with manufactur-
Seas., 59 (1954). Therefore, while the Code generally treats partnerships as aggregates for
taxpayer obligations and as entities for the purpose of calculating the filing informational
returns, there are exceptions.
I Section 38 of the Code grants the taxpayer a credit against tax and authorizes the
promulgation of regulations necessary to administer the credit. I.R.C. § 38. Code §§ 46-48
set out the rules for determining the amount of investment credit available to each taxpayer.
I.R.C. §§ 46-48. To be eligible for investment credit, property must first qualify as "section
38 property." See text accompanying notes 9-12 infra. Of the taxpayer's "section 38 prop-
erty," a percentage, which increases with the propertys useful life, becomes the taxpayer's
"qualified investment." I.R.C. § 46(c). A taxpayer receives an investment credit equal to ten
percent of his "qualified investment" in property acquired and placed in service after January
21, 1975 and before January 1, 1981. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(A). Additional credit is available to
corporations that elect to contribute a sum equal to one percent of their qualified investment
for the year to a qualifying employee stock ownership plan. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(B). The invest-
ment credit rate for property placed into service before January 22, 1975 is seven percent of
the taxpayer's "qualified investment." I.R.C. § 47(a)(2)(C). While the credit generally is
taken in the year the property is placed into service, it may be taken earlier for property with
a normal construction period of more than two years, an expected useful life of more than
seven years, and on which progress payments are made. I.R.C. § 46(d).
While the Code allows a taxpayer to offset completely his first $25,000 of tax liability
with investment credit, only fifty percent of any tax liability exceeding $25,000 may be offset
by the credit. I.R.C. § 46(a)(3). Credit not usable in a current year because of this limitation
may be carried back to the three preceding years or carried forward to the next seven years.
I.R.C. § 46(b). If a taxpayer takes investment credit on property and later disposes of the
property before the end of its useful life, the Code requires that the taxpayer's tax for the
year of the early disposition be increased by the amount that the credit would have been
decreased had the original credit been computed on the period of actual use instead of
estimated use. See I.R.C. § 47.
8 Prior to 1971, the Code required a useful life of four years for property to qualify as
"section 38 property." The taxpayer has the burden of establishing the useful life of property
for which he intends to take investment credit. Spartenburg Terminal Co. v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.
916 (1976) (taxpayer failed to carry burden of establishing useful life for grading and tunnel
base; no depreciation or investment credit allowed).
See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 528 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (invest-
ment credit denied where bottles and cases were expensed currently rather than depreciated);
Rev. Rul. 75-491, 1975-2 C.B. 19 (molten tin used in float process manufacturing of flat glass
is not depreciable).
W Frequently, the courts have been called on to determine whether a specific item is
tangible personal property. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 599
(5th Cir. 1977) (seismic data tapes are tangible personal property); Kramertown Co. v.
Comm'r, 488 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1974) (rooftop airconditioning and heating units are not
tangible personal property); Walt Disney Prod. v. United States, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974) (motion picture negatives are tangible personal property);
Weirick v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 446 (1974) (ski resort line towers and wooden ramps are tangible
personal property, earth ramps are not). In deciding whether an item is tangible personal
1978] 1015
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ing, production, or one of several other specified activities." If the property
has been in service before the taxpayer purchases it, the property also must
qualify as "used section 38 property" in order to be eligible for the credit.
12
Section 48(c)(1) of the Code states that property is not "used section 38
property" if "after its acquisition by the taxpayer, it is used by a person
who used such property before such acquisition .... ,113 That section goes
on to exclude from "used section 38 property" all property purchased by a
person who is related in any one of several ways to a person who used the
property before the acquisition."
In effect, section 48(c)(1) conditions the availability of investment
credit for "section 38 property," the use of which is transferred between a
partner and his partnership, on whether the partnership is viewed as an
aggregate or an entity in its use of partnership property. If the partnership
is viewed as an aggregate, property used by the partnership would be
considered to have been used by the individual partners. Thus, when the
use of "section 38 property" is transferred between a partner and his part-
nership, the partner would be deemed to have used the property both
before and after the transaction. Since the property would have been used
property the courts often look for guidance to the regulations that interpret § 48 of the Code,
the section that defines "section 38 property" as including certain tangible property. One
such regulation, Treasury Regulation § 1.48-1(c), defines tangible personal property as "any
tangible property except land and improvements thereto, such as buildings or other inher-
ently permanent structures. . . ... The Regulation also states that local law is not controlling
for purposes of determining whether property is tangible personal property and that all
property in the nature of machinery shall be considered tangible personal property. Tress.
Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1964). In at least one case, however, a court has found the applicable
regulation invalid because it was contrary to the intent of § 48 of the Code. Walt Disney Prod.
v. United States, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973) (Regulation § 1.48-1(f) invalid as contrary to
the intent of § 48 of Code insofar as it relates to this case).
" I.R.C. § 48(a). To qualify as "section 38 property," tangible property that is not
personal property must function as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or extrac-
tion or of furnishing transportation, communications, electrical energy, gas, water, or sewage
disposal services. If used in connection with one of the above activities, property which
constitutes a research facility or facility for the bulk storage of fungible commodities also
qualifies. I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(B). Several cases concerning whether certain types of property
satisfy these requirements have been decided. See, e.g., Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. United
States, 538 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1976) (docks, dock additions, and inspection lanes do not
qualify under Code § 48(a)(1)(B)); Thirup v. Comm'r, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974) (green-
houses used to produce flowers are eligible for investment credit); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Ken. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 491
F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974) (structures used for storing tobacco are eligible for investment
credit). In addition, elevators and escalators constructed or acquired after June 30, 1963 are
considered "section 38 property." I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(C).
" I.R.C. § 48(b) & (c).
" I.R.C. § 48(c)(1).
" Id. The relevant portion of § 48(c)(1) states that "[p]roperty shall not be treated as
'used section 38 property' if, after its acquisition by the taxpayer, it is used by a person who
used such property before such acquisition (or by a person who bears a relationship described
in section 179(d)(2)(A) or (B) to a person who used such property before such acquisition)."
For an explanation of exactly what relationships are excluded from "used section 38 property"
by § 48(c)(1), see note 37 infra.
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by the same person both before and after the transaction, it would not
qualify as "used section 38 property" and would not be eligible for invest-
ment credit. If, on the other hand, the partnership is viewed as an entity,
property used by the partnership would be deemed to have been used by
the partnership entity, not the individual partners. Accordingly, a pur-
chaser could take an investment credit on his investment in the property
since it would not be deemed to have been used by the partner both before
and after the transaction.
Treasury Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) 1 addresses the question of
whether a partnership uses its property as an aggregate or an entity. This
regulation regards property that has been used by a partnership as having
been used by each partner for the purpose of determining whether the
property qualifies as "used section 38 property."16 By treating partnerships
as aggregates, the regulation would eliminate the possibility of investment
credit for transactions involving a partner and his partnership. 7 Recent
cases, however, have held that Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) is contrary to
" Tress. Reg. § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) (1964).
I' While Tress. Reg. § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) treats partnerships as aggregates, another part of
the same regulation applies the entity theory. Regulation § 1.48-3(c) (3), which explains Code
§§ 48(c)(2)(A) & (B), treats the partnership as an entity for purposes of the Code's limit on
the amount of "used section 38 property" which can be counted toward investment credit in
any one taxable year. According to the regulation, the partnership entity can count its "used
section 38 property" only up to the Code's limit for the taxable year, recently increased from
$50,000 to $100,000. Each partner is also limited to $100,000 of "used section 38 property"
by Code § 48(c)(2)(D). In addition, the partner must include his proportionate share of the
partnership's "used section 38 property" in reaching his $100,000 limit. If partnerships were
considered aggregates for the purpose of the limitation on the amount of "used section 38
property" available per year, the limit would only apply to the individual partners.
In Bryant v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 848 (1966), a partnership elected under Code § 761(a) not
to be treated as a partnership for Subchapter K purposes. When the partners computed the
amount of investment credit they could take on their individual returns, they ignored the
limit on the amount of "used section 38 property" a partnership could claim in a year. The
Tax Court, however, held that since the investment credit provisions are not included in
Subchapter K, the limitation on the amount of "used section 38 property" for each year still
applied to the partnership and that the partners could take only their proportionate share of
the $50,000 of the "used section 38 property" allowed the partnership for the taxable year.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision. Bryant v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 800 (5th
Cir. 1968). Treating the partnership as an entity for purposes of the limit on the amount of
"used section 38 property" allowable per year was crucial in this case. If the partnership had
been considered an aggregate for the purposes of this limit, the individual partners would
have been allowed to count as much of their proportionate share of the partnership's "used
section 38 property" as the limitation on the amount of "used section 38 property" they could
take as individuals would allow, regardless of whether they had elected not to be considered
as a partnership.
A similar limit is found in Code § 46(a)(3). Instead of limiting the amount of "used
section 38 property" allowable per year, § 46(a)(3) limits the amount of investment credit
that can be used to offset tax liability in a given year. See note 7 supra. Here, however, the
Code treats the partnership as an aggregate. Since the partnership itself does not pay income
tax, I.R.C. § 701, the limit on the amount of investment credit allowable per year applies
only to the partners as individuals. [1978] 2 FED. TAXEs (P-H) 5937 at 5974-F. See also
Tress. Reg. § 1.48-3(f) (1964).
11 See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
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the intent of Congress and invalid.'8 The Tax Court's decisions in Edward
A. Moradian,'9 Holloman v. Commissioner,25 and Kipperman v.
Commissioner,2' and the Fifth Circuit's affirmation in Holloman, 2 have
held uniformly that property used by a partnership should be treated as
having been used by the partnership as an entity, not by the individual
partners.
Moradian, a 1969 decision, was the first case to require the Tax Court
to determine whether a partnership uses property as an aggregate or an
entity.2 Edward Moradian and Nick Hagopian were equal general part-
ners 2 in a farming partnership.2 The two purchased land used in the
farming operation as tenants in common shortly before forming their part-
nership. 26 The land contained grapevines which became a substantial part
of the assets used by the partnership in the production of grapes.Y After
the dissolution of the Moradian-Hagopian partnership, Hagopian sold his
undivided one-half interest in the land used by the partnership to Mor-
adian's wife, Georgia.2s The Moradians continued the grape growing busi-
ness as a partnership under the name of Gem Farms. On their joint federal
," Kipperman v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 146, 148 (1977); Holloman v. Comm'r, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 1354, 1356 (1975), aff'd, 551 F.2d 987, 990 (5th Cir. 1977); Edward A. Mor-
adian, 53 T.C. 207, 210-11 (1969). While Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) has been held invalid,
the Tax Court has applied Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(i) in at least one case. In Ocrant v.
Comm'r, 65 T.C. 1156 (1976), the Tax Court, relying on Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(i), disal-
lowed an investment credit because the taxpayer failed to show that the property had not
been used by the same person both before and after its acquisition as the I.R.S. had claimed.
" 53 T.C. 207 (1969).
34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1354 (1975).
21 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 146 (1977).
2 551 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1977).
53 T.C. 207 (1969). James T. McKay, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1478 (1968), a previous Tax
Court decision, raised the question of whether a partnership uses property as an aggregate or
an entity. The court, however, decided McKay, without reaching this question. In McKay, a
taxpayer/partner claimed an investment credit for some office equipment he had purchased
from his partnership. Id. at 1483. The IRS disallowed the credit. The Tax Court then deter-
mined that the taxpayer/partner owned more than a fifty percent interest in his partnership.
Section 48(c)(1) excludes from "used section 38 property" all property that is used after its
acquisition by someone "related" in one of several ways to the person who used it before its
acquisition. See text accompanying note 14 supra. Since § 707(b) of the Code, as it applies
to section 48(c)(1), includes a partnership and a partner who owns more than fifty percent of
the partnership as being "related", the Tax Court held that the office equipment was not
"used section 38 property" and that the taxpayer/partner was not entitled to an investment
credit for its purchase. See note 37 infra.
24 53 T.C. at 209. As equal partners, Moradian and Hagopian split the profits and losses
from their farming partnership. Id. at 208. The fact that the partners divided the profits
equally is important for investment credit purposes since Regulation § 1.46-3(f)(2) provides
that a partner's share of the partnership's investment credit is determined in accordance with
the ratio used to divide the partnership profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(f)(2) (1964).
25 53 T.C. at 207-08.
20 Id. at 208.
2' The grapevines were apparently attached to the land purchased by Moradian and
Hagopian. Id. at 214 (Scott, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 208.
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income tax return, the Moradians claimed an investment credit attributa-
ble to Georgia's acquisition of the grapevines. The IRS disallowed the
credit, creating a deficiency for the taxable year, and the Moradians peti-
tioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency."3
The IRS claimed that since Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) treats property
used by a partnership as being used by each partner, Edward Moradian
had used the grapevines both before and after the purchase by his wife.?
Therefore, the IRS argued, section 48(c)(1) of the Code would prohibit
Georgia Moradian from receiving investment credit for the purchase of the
grapevines." The Tax Court, however, refused to base its decision on the
regdlation. Instead, the court relied on the Code provisions and congres-
sional committee reports dealing with investment credit to find that the
regulation was invalid as applied by the IRS to the facts in Moradian. The
court held that property used by a partnership should be considered as
having been used by the partnership as an entity.3 After so finding, the
court had little trouble in holding that Georgia Moradian was entitled to
investment credit for her purchase of the grapevines.?
2 Id. A taxpayer desiring to challenge a deficiency determination by the IRS has several
courses of action available. He can, as the taxpayer did in Moradian, file a petition with the
Tax Court for a redetermination of deficiency. The action resulting from such a petition is
commonly called a deficiency suit. See I.R.C. §§ 6211-15. Alternatively, the taxpayer can pay
the deficiency and file a claim for a refund. If the claim is not granted, the taxpayer may file
a suit for refund in either the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970), or a federal district
court, 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1970). Finally, the taxpayer may ignore the deficiency altogether. If
the taxpayer does not pay the deficiency, the government can resort to the lien on the
taxpayer's property that attaches at the time of the assessment. I.R.C. § 6321. The govern-
ment may start a civil action in a district court to enforce the lien up to the amount of the
deficiency. See I.R.C. § 7403.
In choosing which course of action to follow, the taxpayer should consider several factors.
One such factor is that while payment of the deficiency is a prerequisite in refund suits, the
taxpayer does not have to pay the deficiency before bringing a deficiency suit. The taxpayer
also should consider the fact that an adverse decision in a deficiency suit requires not only
the payment of the deficiency but also the payment of an interest charge. Additional factors
which may be important to a taxpayer include: lack of an appeal right to a circuit court of
appeals from the Court of Claims; the availability of jury trials only in district courts; the
availability of small claims procedures in the Tax Court, and the differences in the technical
competency of the judges of the various courts in tax related matters. See J. CHOMME,
Fans INcomE TAxrION § 297 (2d Ed. 1973).
" 53 T.C. at 209.
If Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) were followed, the grapevines would not qualify as
"used section 38 property" and therefore would not be eligible for investment credit. See text
accompanying note 12 supra. To qualify as "used section 38 property" the grapevines must
first quality as "section 38 property." See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra. The grape-
vines must be "tangible personal property" or "other tangible property" within the meaning
of § 48(a)(1) to qualify as "section 38 property." While the grapevines would not appear td
qualify as tangible personal property, Regulation § 1.48-1(d)(2), which lists orchards, gar-
dens, and nurseries as examples of "other tangible property," indicates that grapevines are
in fact "section 38 property." See also Powers v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal.
1968).
1 53 T.C. at 212.
3 Id. at 214.
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In deciding that a partnership should be considered as using property
as an entity, the court reasoned that the failure of the IRS to treat a
partnership as a "person" for purposes of section 48(c)(1) was inconsistent
with the definition of the term "person" in section 7701(a)(1) of the Code.u
Section 7701(a) (1) defines "person" as including partnerships unless other-
wise expressed or unless incompatible with the intent of a particular sec-
tion.3" This definition, which treats partnerships as entities, is not ex-
pressly precluded by section 48 and does not appear to be incompatible
with the intent of the investment credit provisions." Since section 48(c) (1)
excludes from "used section 38 property" all property used by the same
"person" before and after its acquisition and since the Code includes part-
nerships as "persons," the language of the Code itself strongly indicates
that the use of property by a partnership should be attributed to the
partnership entity.
The court also noted that to consider the individual partners as having
used the grapevines would in certain situations nullify that portion of
section 48(c)(1) that excludes from "used section 38 property" all property
used by a person related to someone who had used the property before its
purchase.37 For the purposes of section 48(c)(1), section 707(b) deems such
Id. at 211.
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1).
31 See text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
3 53 T.C. at 211. See text accompanying note 14 supra. Section 48(c)(1) incorporates
from other sections of the Code the types of relationships between pre-transfer property users
and post-transfer users that will exclude property from being "used § 38 property." Section
48(c)(1) excludes from "used section 38 property" all property that is used after its purchase
by a person who bears a relationship described in § 179(d)(2)(A) or (B) to a person who used
the property before the acquisition. For the exact text of this limitation see note 15 supra.
The main purpose of § 179 is to grant an additional first-year depreciation allowance for small
business owning qualifying property. As it relates to § 38(c)(1), however, § 179(d)(2)(B)
excludes from "used section 38 property" any property that is acquired by one component
member of a controlled group from another component member of the same controlled group.
The term controlled group as defined in § 1563 includes chains of corporations connected
through stock ownership with a parent corporation, two or more corporations in which less
than six people own most of the stock, and certain insurance companies. For the purposes of
§ 48(c)(1), the percentage of ownership needed by a parent corporation for a chain of corpora-
tions to qualify as a controlled group is reduced from "at least 80 percent" to "more than 50
percent." I.R.C. § 48(c)(3)(C).
Section 179(d)(1)(A) excludes from property eligible for the additional first-year depre-
ciation allowance and therefore from "used section 38 property," those relationships that
would result in the disallowance of losses under § 267 and § 707(b) of the Code. Section 267
disallows losses for nine different relationships listed in § 267(d), the most important of which
for the purposes of § 38(c)(1) seems to be members of a family. Thus, for example, when a
taxpayer purchases farm equipment from his father for use on a farm rented to him by his
father, no investment credit will be allowed for the purchase of the farm equipment since it
does not qualify as "used section 38 property." Schelling v. United States, (D.C. Iowa, 1976),
38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5903. Section 707(b) disallows losses on sales or exchanges of property
between a partnership and a partner owning more than a fifty percent interest in the partner-
ship and between two partnerships in which the same person owns more than a fifty percent
interest. Therefore, property involved in these types of transactions will not qualify as "used
section 38 property" and will not be eligible for investment credit.
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a relationship to exist between a partnership and a partner owning more
than fifty percent of the partnership as well as between two partnerships
in which the same individual owns more than fifty percent." Therefore,
property involved in transactions between a partnership and a partner
owning more than fifty percent of the partnership or between two partner-
ships in which the same individual owns more than a fifty percent interest
will not qualify as "used section 38 property." If partnerships are treated
as aggregates, however, this limitation becomes meaningless. Under the
aggregate theory, property involved in a transaction between a partner and
his partnership could never qualify as 'used section 38 property" since the
partner is deemed to have used the property both before and after the
transaction.3 Thus, the Tax Court concluded that the only way to give full
meaning to the restriction on transactions between "related" persons is to
treat partnerships as entities."
The Moradian court found additional support for its holding in the
legislative history of the investment credit. Noting that Congress first en-
acted the investment credit provisions 1 to "stimulate investment" and
"increase the competitiveness of American exports in world markets," the
court reasoned that Congress intended the statute to be interpreted liber-
ally."2 The court decided that section 48(c)(1) was intended to prevent the
taking of investment credit only in situations where the goals of the invest-
ment credit were not met." Applying this reasoning to the Moradian facts,
the court concluded that Georgia Moradian's purchase furthered the goals
of the investment credit, and accordingly, was not one of the abuses section
48(c) (1) was intended to prevent."
See note 37 supra.
See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
8 53 T.C. at 211-12.
41 Congress first established the investment credit in the Revenue Act of 1962. Revenue
Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2, 76 Stat. 960 (1962). In 1966, Congress suspended the
investment credit for the period between October 10, 1966 and December 31, 1967 as part of
a plan to curb inflation. Act of Nov. 25, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1508 (1966). When
the economy became sluggish in 1967, Congress acted to limit the suspension period to March
9, 1967 instead of December 31, 1967. Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57
(1967). When the country faced another period of high inflation in 1969, Congress added §
49 to the Code and thus, with a few exceptions, terminated the investment credit. Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 703(a), 83 Stat. 487 (1966). Another lag in the economy
prompted the reinstatement of the investment credit by the addition of § 50 in 1971. Revenue
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178 § 101, 85 Stat. 497 (1971). The investment credit provisions
have been in effect since 1971. See MERTENs, supra note 5 at § 32A.57.
a Id. at 212.
Id. at 213. The court felt that the goal of the investment credit, to stimulate the
economy by encouraging businesses to invest in additional capital assets, is not furthered
when the asset acquired continues to be used by the same person who used it before its
acquisition. Id.
" Specifically, the court noted that Mrs. Moradian's personal business activities were
increased by virtue of her acquisition of the grapevines. Thus, her purchase of the grapevines
would stimulate the economy because of the increase in her personal business activities and
because the economy is strengthened by a ready turnover of business assets. Id.
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The IRS has made its disagreement with the Moradian court's decision
quite clear.4 In 1973, the IRS nonacquiesced to the Moradian decision."
Then in Revenue Ruling 74-64,4 the IRS stated that it would continue to
apply Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) despite the Tax Court's holding in
Moradian.
Notwithstanding these actions by the IRS, in Holloman v.
Commissioner," the Tax Court again held that a partnership should be
treated as an entity for purposes of section 48(c)(1). Holloman, the tax-
payer in that case, formed a partnership with a fellow dentist, Dr. Blan-
kenship, to practice dentistry."9 Blankenship leased to the partnership den-
tal equipment he had owned prior to the formation of the partnership.
When the partnership was terminated, Holloman purchased the dental
equipment from Blankenship and claimed an investment credit for the
purchase. The IRS disallowed the investment credit and Holloman
brought a deficiency suit before the Tax Court. 0 Relying on Regulation §
1.48-3(a)(ii), the IRS claimed that Holloman had used the dental equip-
ment as a member of the dental partnership before purchasing the equip-
ment for his own practice." The Tax Court, however, relied on the same
reasoning it used in Moradian and held that Holloman was entitled to
investment credit for his purchase of the dental equipment."2
The IRS appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's deci-
sion.'s The Fifth Circuit held that the reference in section 48(c)(1) to use
by a "person" does not refer to the individual who physically used the
property, but rather to the legal entity which used it." The court reasoned
41 The IRS appealed the Moradian decision, but withdrew the appeal before the case was
heard. See Pusey, The Partnership as an "Entity:" Implications of Basye, 54 TAxES 143, 158
n.57 (1976).
" 1973-2 C.B.4. In nonacquiescing to a decision, the IRS is, in effect, saying that it will
continue to contest the issue decided in that case as it arises in future cases.
" Rev. Rul. 74-64, 1974-1 C.B. 12, 13. Revenue Ruling 74-64 states the position of the
IRS on the availability of investment credit for a taxpayer who has purchased a 25 percent
working interest in an oil and gas lease joint venture from an individual who owned 50 per-
cent of the oil and gas joint venture. The Ruling states that the joint venture would be treated
as a partnership for the purpose of determining the availability of investment credit. See Rev.
Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30. See also note 5 supra. The Ruling then states that the IRS will
continue to apply Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) which requires that property used by a part-
nership be considered as having been used by each partner. Thus, those persons who retained
an interest in the oil and gas lease both before and after the taxpayer purchased a 25 percent
share of it were deemed to have used the oil and gas lease both before and after its purchase
by the taxpayer. Since § 48(c)(1) of the Code excludes from "used section 38 property" any
property used by the same person both before and after its acquisition by the taxpayer, the
purchaser's interest in the oil and gas lease would not be "used section 38 property" and
would not be eligible for investment credit.
" 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1354 (1975).
, Id. at 1355.
50 Id.; see note 29 supra.
" 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1356.
52 Id. at 1356-57.
551 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 989. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that if the reference in § 48(c)(1) to use by a
[Vol. XXXV
ARE PARTNERSHIPS AGGREGATES
that since the Code treats the partnership as a separate "person," the use
of equipment by a partnership should not be charged to individual part-
ners unless the partner owned more than fifty percent of the partnership."
Despite Moradian and Holloman, the IRS has refused to admit defeat.
Kipperman v. Commissioner" is the latest case to grow out of the insist-
ence of the IRS that the partnership should be considered an aggregate in
determining whether investment credit is available for used property. In-
stead of the partner purchasing property used by the partnership as in the
two previous cases, Kipperman involved a partnership that purchased
property from one of its partners. Kipperman, an attorney, owned as a
tenant in common property necessary for the practice of law. 7 Kipperman
then formed a partnership with several other attorneys. The partnership
purchased Kipperman's undivided one-half interest in the property he
owned as a tenant in common as well as some additional personal property
owned by Kipperman." Kipperman then claimed investment credit for his
share of the property purchased by the partnership.5'
The IRS asserted that since the property had been used by Kipperman
both before and after its purchase'by the partnership, it was not "used
section 38 property" and therefore, did not qualify for investment credit
purposes. 0 As in Moradian and Holloman, Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii)
was the basis for this argument. 1 The IRS attempted to distinguish
Kipperman from Moradian and Holloman by pointing out that the peti-
tioner in Kipperman had both the use and the ownership of the concerned
property before and after its acquisition.2 The IRS claimed that by com-
parison the taxpayer in Moradian had neither the use nor ownership of the
concerned property before its purchase, and that in Holloman the taxpayer
did not have the ownership of the involved property prior to its purchase.U
The Tax Court, citing its two previous decisions, again disapproved of the
person means the individual person who physically uses the property, many situations would
arise for which an investment credit would be denied even though common sense would
dictate otherwise. For example, if a taxpayer starts a niw business and purchases equipment
from an unrelated taxpayer and then hires the same person who had operated the equipment
for the former owner to operate it for him, there would be no investment credit allowed for
the purchase of the equipment. The Fifth Circuit could see no purpose for such an interpreta-
tion of the statute. Id.
" Id. at 989. The exception for a partner who owns more than 50 percent of a partnership
recognizes the provisions of § 707(b) which are incorporated into § 48(c)(1). See note 37 supra.
36 T.C.M. (CCH) 146 (1977).
The property Kipperman owned as a tenant in common with the other attorney consis-
ted mainly of law books and office furniture. Id. at 146.
m Id. at 146-47. After buying Kipperman's interest in the property, the partnership sold
its interest in the office furniture to the attorney who owned the other one-half interest and
divided up the law books with him. Id.
10 Id. at 147.
oId.
it Id.
62 Id. at 148.
63 Id.
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regulation." In granting Kipperman a summary judgment on his claim for
his share of the investment credit resulting from the partnership's pur-
chase of the property," the Tax Court dismissed the argument of the IRS
by stating that the crux of its two earlier decisions, that a partnership
should be considered an entity for purposes of section 48(c)(1), was still
applicable in Kipperman."
Any attempt to analyze the decisions of the Tax Court and the Fifth
Circuit in the Moradian, Holloman, and Kipperman cases must take into
account the fact that such a holding requires the invalidation of Regulation
§ 1.48-3(a) (2) (ii). Since Code section 780567 and Regulation § 301.7805-1"
authorize the Commissioner of the IRS, with the approval of the Secretary
of the Treasury, to prescribe all rules and regulations needed for the en-
forcement of the Code, such regulations are accorded considerable weight."
In addition, Code section 38(b) confers upon the Commissioner, as dele-
gate of the Secretary, specific statutory authority to prescribe regulations
for carrying out the provisions of the investment credit. 0 Courts have long
held that such statutory grants of authority furnish powerful support for
regulations and that regulations promulgated under these statutory provi-
sions should not be declared invalid unless clearly contrary to the legisla-
tive mandate.7'
Thus, for the decisions of the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit in
Moradian, Holloman, and Kipperman to be justified, Regulation § 1.48-
3(a)(2)(ii) must be clearly contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the
investment credit provisions. The investment credit was added to the Code
in order to stimulate the economy by encouraging investment in capital
equipment that would make the investor's business more competitive and
increase its productive capacity.72 To prevent abuses, Congress limited
credit for used property to instances where the same person does not use
the property both before and after the transaction. 3 The purchase of "used
"Id.
13 In allowing Kipperman to take his share of the investment credit resulting from the
partnership's purchase of the property, the court was following Regulation § 1.46-3(f), which
states that each partner shall be treated as the taxpayer for his share of the partnership's
"section 38 property." Treas. Reg. 1.46-3(f) (1964). See note 24 supra. By dividing up the
investment credit due to a partnership among its partners, this regulation treats partnerships
as aggregates.
"36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 148.
I.R.C. § 7805.
'5 Tress. Reg. § 301.7805-1 (1960).
' United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973), Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S.
118, 127 (1952); Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 354-55 (1935). See MERTENS, supra note
5, at § 3.20.
,0 I.R.C. § 38(b).
' Comm'r v. South Texas Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948); Lucas v. American Code Co.,
280 U.S. 445 (1930).
72 See S. REP. No. 1881, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1962), reprinted in [19621 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3297, 3313-16.
n S. REP. No. 1881, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3297, 3317.
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section 38 property" and its immediate lease back to the original owner
with the purchaser claiming investment credit is an example of the type
of situation the limitation in Section 48(c)(1) is intended to prevent. 4
Regulation § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) was promulgated in connection with this
limitation. But if partnership property is considered as being used by each
partner as the regulation requires, investment credit will be denied for
some transactions that would further the goals Congress had in mind when
it established the credit. For example, the regulation would deny a partner
with a one percent interest in his partnership from taking investment
credit on property he purchased from his partnership even if he had never
physically used the property. Credit would not be granted despite the fact
that following the transaction the purchaser would have at his disposal
property that he did not have prior to the transaction which he could use
to increase his business' productive capacity and to improve its competi-
tiveness. 5
In addition to the fact that Regulation § 1.48-3(a) (2) (ii) would deny an
investment credit in situations where the credit should be permitted, there
are other strong indications that the regulation is contrary to congressional
intent. As the Tax Court pointed out, the use of the word "person"7 and
the fact that the part of section 48(c)(1) that deals with related parties
would be rendered surplusage by that regulation 7 weigh against the regula-
tion's validity. Taken together these factors reveal that Regulation § 1.48-
3(a)(2)(ii) is not consistent with the Code's investment credit provisions.
These same factors strongly support treating partnerships as entities
for the purpose of determining whether used property is eligible for invest-
ment credit. Thus, although the IRS maycontinue to relitigate the issue,
the decisions by the Moradian, Holloman, and Kipperman courts holding
1' The sale and leaseback agreement is mentioned specifically by Congress as one of the
abuses the limitation against property used by the same person both before and after the
agreement was intended to prevent. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 158-59 (1962).
Other examples of abuses this limitation is intended to prevent are the purchase by a tax-
payer of property he had been leasing and the sale of property by a lessor subject to a lease.
Id. The Moradian court inferred from the examples listed in this committee report that the
abuse envisioned by Congress was the possibility that an investment credit might be procured
by an individual when the purposes of the investment credit are not met. 53 T.C. at 213. For
the purpose of investment credit, see the text accompanying note 72 supra.
11 The Moradian, Holloman, and Kipperman cases also involve situations in which Regu-
lation § 1.483(a)(2)(ii) would deny an investment credit when the purposes of the investment
credit would be further served by granting credit. In Moradian, the purchase of the property
by Mrs. Moradian put at her disposal property which increased her business activities. See
text accompanying notes 23-44 supra. In Holloman, the petitioner's purchase of dental equip-
ment at least indirectly stimulated investment since the party who sold the equipment would
have had to purchase other equipment if he wished to continue his practice of dentistry. See
text accompanying notes 48-55 supra. In Kipperman, the purchase of the law books by the
partnership improved the partnership's ability to serve its clients. See text accompanying
notes 56-66 supra.
1' See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
17 See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
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that partnerships use property as entities seem to be well founded.,, Such
a conclusion indicates that a partner should be able to purchase property
used previously by one of its partners without losing an otherwise available
investment credit.
KuRT L. JoNEs
Is In addition, the decisions of the Moradian, Holloman, and Kipperman courts are
consistent with the Code's general treatment of partnerships as entities for most purposes
other than the actual payment of taxes. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
